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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The District Court's Amended Order Granting Wells Fargo's Motion for 
Summary Judgment ("Amended Order") was entered on September 18, 2002 [Record 
on Appeal ("R.") 109-114, Appellant's Addendum ("Aplt. Add.") j]. Pursuant to 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b), the Amended Order was certified as final as to the claims of 
plaintiff-appellant R. A. McKell Excavating, Inc. ("McKell"), against defendant-
appellee Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo"), and Wells Fargo's claims against 
McKell.1 (R. 112, 1 5) McKell timely filed its notice of appeal on October 4, 2002, 
pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 4(a). (R. 115-117) This Court has appellate jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
!The Amended Order did not dispose of Wells Fargo's Counterclaim against McKell, 
which alleged that Wells Fargo's Trust Deed had priority over McKell's mechanic's 
lien (R. 31). Although the district court's Findings of Fact found that McKell 
commenced work two days before Wells Fargo recorded its Trust Deed (R. 87, ^f 2, 
3), there was no finding that this work constituted visible onsite work, as required in 
order to give McKell's lien priority under Utah Code Ann., § 38-1-5. See, Ketchum, 
Konkel, Barrett, Nickel & Austin v. Heritage Mt. Dev. Co., 784 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Utah 
App. 1989), cert, den., Pollack v. Heritage Mt., 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
However, the Amended Order did finally dispose of McKell's First Claim for Relief 
(R. 3-4), as against Wells Fargo and its co-defendants (R. 113, ^ 3), as required for 
certification under Rule 54(b). Even though Wells Fargo's co-defendants were not a 
party to Wells Fargo's motion, the district court made it clear that the court's ruling on 
the motion would apply to the co-defendants as well [Transcript of June 26, 2002 
hearing ("Tr."), pp. 3-4] . Excerpts of this Transcript cited herein are attached hereto 
as Addendum ("Aple. Add.") A. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue No. 1: Whether the district court correctly ruled that under Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-1-11(1)(a), the 12 month statute of limitations for filing an action to enforce a 
mechanic's lien on non-residential property, "final completion of the original contract" 
occurs when the contractor ceases and abandons the work to be performed under the 
contract. 
Standard of Review: The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law subject 
to the de novo standard of review. See, Ketchum, supra, 784 P.2d at 1220. Also, the 
appellate court may affirm summary judgment on any ground available to the district 
court, even if not relied upon by the district court. See, Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. 
Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 1990). 
Preservation of Issue: (R. 58-66) 
Issue No. 2: Whether the district court correctly ruled, based on the 
undisputed facts, that McKell did not file this action to enforce its mechanic's lien 
within 12 months after McKell ceased and abandoned the work to be performed under 
the contract. 
Standard of Review: In reviewing a summary judgment, the appellate court 
views the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party. Summary judgment 
will be affirmed where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, or where, even 
according to the facts alleged by the losing party, the moving party is entitled to 
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judgment is a matter of law. See, Themy v. Seagull Enterprises, Inc., 595 P.2d 526, 
528-529 (Utah 1979). 
Preservation of Issue: R. 58-66. To the extent that McKell is now arguing 
that there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether or when McKell ceased 
and abandoned the work to be performed under the contract, this argument was not 
raised in the district court [R. 58-66; Tr. generally], is therefore waived, and may not 
be considered by the appellate court.2 See, Hart v. Salt Lake County Commission, 945 
P.2d 125, 129-130 (Utah App. 1997), cert, den., 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997). 
However, the appellate court may affirm summary judgment on any ground available to 
the district court, even if not relied upon by the district court. See, Projects Unlimited, 
supra. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Wells Fargo generally agrees with McKell's Statement of the Case, 
describing the nature of the case, and the course of proceedings and disposition in the 
district court, except as set forth below. 
Wells Fargo denies that its deed of trust was not recorded until after McKell 
started visible onsite work (R. 31). Also, one of Wells Fargo's arguments in the 
district court was that the 12-month statute of limitations began to run no later than 
2At oral argument in the district court, the only factual issue McKell attempted to raise 
was whether and when final completion of the contract occurred according to McKell's 
interpretation of the statute of limitations, not whether and when McKell had abandoned 
the contract (Tr. 28, Aple. Add. A). 
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November 2, 2000, based upon McKell1s admission, discussed below, that it recorded 
its notice of lien on that date because it knew defendant Carter Construction 
Development, L.L.C. ("Carter"), the owner of the real property with whom McKell 
contracted, was unwilling or unable to pay McKell for work McKell had already done 
(R. 71-72). Although not reflected in the district court's written Findings and 
Conclusions (R. 83-89), at oral argument, the district court's verbal ruling adopted this 
argument as an alternative ground for granting Wells Fargo's motion for summary 
judgment (Tr. 28, 43-44, Aple. Add. A).3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Wells Fargo generally agrees with McKell's Statement of Facts, except as set 
forth below. 
Paragraphs. With respect to Paragraph 5 of McKell's Statement of Facts, 
neither the district court's Finding of Fact No. 3 (R. 87), nor Paragraph 5 of the 
Affidavit of Gordon Erickson dated May 16, 2002 ("Erickson Aff.," R. 59), upon 
which that Finding was based, establish when McKell first performed visible onsite 
work. 
Paragraphs 9 and 10. Paragraph 10 of McKell's Statement of Facts is based 
on Paragraph 12 of the Erickson Aff., and Paragraph 9 of McKell's Statement of Facts 
3This verbal ruling is as much a part of the district court's decision as the court's 
written Findings and Conclusions. See, Merriam v. Merriam, 799 P.2d 1172, 1177 
(UtahApp. 1990). 
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is based on the district court's Finding of Fact No. 7, which in turn is based on 
Paragraph 10 of the Erickson Aff. (R. 58, 87, 97, Aplt Add. h, i). Paragraph 12 of the 
Erickson Aff. claims that McKell intended to complete its work under the contract upon 
payment for work already done, and guaranty of the availability of funds for payment 
of the work remaining to be done. 
Paragraph 10 of the Erickson Aff. claims that prior to November 2, 2000, 
McKell negotiated with Carter concerning payment for work McKell performed prior 
to October 5, 2000. Paragraph 10 of the Erickson Aff. further contends that McKell 
recorded its mechanic's lien on November 2, 2000, "... [w]hen Carter would not, or 
could not, pay for the portion of work completed..." 
There is no evidence, either in the Erickson Aff. or anywhere else in the 
record, that after November 2, 2000, McKell made any attempt to negotiate further 
with Carter, concerning either payment for McKell's past work, or assurances of 
payment for future work by McKell. Thus, it is undisputed that, based upon McKellfs 
inability to reach agreement with Carter concerning payment for McKell's past or 
future work, McKell abandoned the contract no later than November 2, 2000. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
While there is no Utah law directly on point, Utah cases interpreting prior 
versions of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(l)(a) support the district court's interpretation of 
the current version of this statute of limitations (or more accurately, statute of repose). 
Under those cases, a contractor completes a contract on the date the contractor stops its 
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work under the contract, as reflected in the notice of lien. Also, the majority of 
jurisdictions considering the issue have held that cessation of work or abandonment of a 
project constitutes completion of the work on that project, for purposes of a mechanic's 
lien statute of limitation that, like the Utah statute of repose, begins to run from the 
time of completion of work. 
To hold otherwise would mean that the statute of repose never begins to run 
in cases, as here, where the project is never completed. Mechanic's lien claimants, like 
McKell here, could cloud title to a property forever, without being forced to file suit to 
establish the validity of their claim, which defeats the whole purpose of the statute of 
repose. 
Here, as the district court ruled, the 12-month statute of repose started to run 
either when McKell ceased work on the project on October 5, 2000, or no later than 
November 2, 2000, when it became clear to McKell that Carter would not, or could 
not, pay for work McKell had already completed, let alone any future work, and 
McKell recorded its notice of lien. Thus, by the time McKell filed this action on 
November 21, 2001, its claim was time barred by the 12-month statute of repose. 
McKell argues that it intended to complete the project, subject to two 
conditions, i.e., payment for past work and assurance of payment for future work. 
McKell also argues that the issues of if and when it abandoned the project are factual 
issues that should have precluded summary judgment. 
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However, McKell never raised this alleged factual dispute in the district 
court, and therefore waived it for purposes of this appeal. Moreover, even if McKell 
had raised this issue, there is no evidence in the record that after McKell recorded its 
notice of lien on November 2, 2000, McKell made any further effort to pursue the two 
conditions it claims would have led to its resumption of work (i.e., payment for past 
work and assurance of payment for future work). Thus, based upon the undisputed 
facts in the record, McKell abandoned the project no later than November 2, 2000, and 
its mechanic's lien claim was time barred no later than November 2, 2001. 
Accordingly, the district court's Amended Order should be affirmed, and 
Wells Fargo should be awarded its attorney fees and costs as the successful party on 
this appeal, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT UNDER 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-11(1)(a), FINAL COMPLETION OF 
THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT OCCURS WHEN THE CONTRAC-
TOR CEASES AND ABANDONS THE WORK TO BE 
PERFORMED UNDER THE CONTRACT 
A. Utah Case Law. 
In Utah, like most jurisdictions, the statutory period for bringing an action to 
enforce a mechanic's lien is jurisdictional, may not be waived, and is therefore a statute 
of repose rather than a statute of limitations. See, AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. 
and Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289, 290-292 (Utah 1986). One reason for making the 
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statutory limitation period jurisdictional is to "...strictly [limit] the time during which 
property is encumbered... ." Id. at 292 (citation omitted) 
The mechanic's lien claimant has the burden of establishing that it has 
brought its action within the limitation period. See, Govert Copier Painting v. Van 
Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163, 172 (Utah App. 1990). In Govert, a painting contractor 
contracted with a homeowner to paint his home. The contractor stopped work on 
February 14, 1986, before the painting was done, because the home, which was under 
construction, had not yet been completed. The contractor and the owner agreed that 
the contractor would leave paint so that the owner could complete the job. 
A payment dispute arose, and the contractor recorded notice of mechanic's 
lien on February 25, 1986, listing February 14, 1986 as the date upon which the last 
work was performed and the last materials were furnished. The contractor filed suit to 
foreclose the lien on June 23, 1987. The version of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11 in 
effect at the time, provided that actions to enforce mechanic's liens, '...must be begun 
within twelve months after completion of the original contract, or the suspension of 
work thereunder for a period of thirty days.' 801 P.2d at 172 (quoting statute, emphasis 
added) The contractor contended that its lawsuit was timely because the paint it had 
left for the owner was not used until some time after July 1, 1986. 
The Utah Court of Appeals held that the statute started to run when the 
contractor stopped work, even though the work was incomplete: "The Utah Supreme 
Court has held that when a contractor finishes his or her work on a job, the statutory 
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period begins to run." 801 P.2d at 173 [citing AAA Fencing, which stated "The time 
for enforcing mechanics' liens set out in section 38-1-11 ... limits a lienor's rights to 
twelve months after his work is completed." (714 P.2d at 292, emphasis added)] 
In Govert the Court of Appeals, like the district court did here, relied on the 
statement in the notice of lien that the last work was performed and the last materials 
were furnished on February 14, 1986, in holding that the statute started to run on that 
date, and that the lien claim was time barred: 
Significantly the notice of lien lists February 14, 1986, 
as the date the last work was performed and materials 
furnished. Thus, Copier Painting had completed the 
performance on its primary contract on February 14, 
1986, and the statutory period began to run on that date. 
Accordingly Copier Painting's filing of this action on 
June 23, 1987, was untimely under section 38-1-11 as it 
was not filed within twelve months of the completion of 
the original contract. 
801 P.2d at 1734 
Wells Fargo is not aware of any reported Utah cases interpreting the present 
version of § 38-1-1 l(l)(a), or of any legislative history pertaining to the language at 
issue here,5 However, the only significant difference between the statutory language at 
4See also, Projects Unlimited, supra, 798 P.2d at 741-742, 751 (12 month period under 
§ 38-1-11 started to run when contractor ceased work before completion, on date set 
forth in notice of lien). 
5Wells Fargo's reply memorandum in the district court mistakenly indicated that the 
present version of § 38-1-1 l(l)(a) was enacted in 2001, and omitted one of the histori-
cal amendments to the statute that was made in 1994 (R. 73, n.l). The present version 
of the statute was enacted in 1995, and the present and historical versions of the statute 
are set forth in McKelfs opening brief at pp. 1-2, 6-7 and Aplt. Add. a through g. 
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issue in the above cases, and the present statute, is that under the present statute the 
12-month period begins to run from "final completion" of the original contract, rather 
than from "completion" of the original contract, and the present version of the statute 
deletes the provision allowing the 12-month period to begin to run 30 days after 
suspension of work under the original contract. 
Wells Fargo submits there is no meaningful distinction between "completion" 
and "final completion," and that the above cases should be followed in interpreting the 
present version of the statute.6 Under those cases, the district court here correctly ruled 
that "final completion" occurred when McKell stopped work on the project on 
October 5, 2000, as set forth in its notice of lien, thereby making this action time 
barred as a matter of law. 
B, Case Law From Other Jurisdictions. 
The majority rule in cases from other jurisdictions is that abandonment of 
work under a contract constitutes completion of work under that contract, for purposes 
6McKell argues that prior to the 1994 amendments to § 38-1-11, "completion" was 
equated with "substantial completion." However, the case it cites deals with the 
timeliness of a notice of lien under § 38-1-7, not the timeliness of a lien foreclosure 
action under § 38-1-11. See, Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & Smith 
Assoc, 827 P.2d 963, 965 (Utah App. 1992). In any event, the cases Wells Fargo 
discusses above did not hold that the contract was substantially complete. They held 
that the contract was entirely complete when the contractor stopped work (as opposed 
to a temporary suspension of work). See, Govert, 801 P.2d at 163. Thus, McKellfs 
reliance on Reliance Insur. Co. v. UtahDept. of Transportation, 858 P.2d 1363, 1370 
(Utah 1993), holding that substantial completion was not final completion, within the 
meaning of a liquidated damages provision of a road construction contract, is similarly 
misplaced. 
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of determining the timeliness of a mechanic's lien claim, under statutes measuring 
timeliness based upon completion of work: 
There is broad authority for a general rule that 
abandonment is the equivalent of completion for 
purposes of the mechanics' lien statutes: and under 
statutes which require the notice, claim or statement of 
mechanics' lien to be filed within a certain time after 
completion of the building or improvement, it is, apart 
from slight authority to the contrary, very generally held 
or recognized that where the building or improvement is 
not completed but work is abandoned thereon, 
abandonment of the work is equivalent to completion for 
the purposes of the statute, and that the filing both may 
and, in order to be timely, must be made within the 
statutory period after such abandonment. 
Carson Construction & Design, Inc. v. Mott & Assoc, P.C., 1994 Del. Super. LEXIS 
74, *5-*6 (Aple. Add. B hereto), quoting Abandonment of Construction or of Contract 
as Affecting Time for Filing Mechanics1 Liens or Time for Giving Notice to Owner, 
52 A.L.R.3d 797, 811 (The Lawyers Co-Operative Publishing Company, Bancroft-
Whitney Company 1973) (emphasis added).7 
7The "slight authority to the contrary" referenced in the above quote includes cases on 
payment bonds, rather than mechanics' lien cases, 52 A.L.R.3d at 811, n.34. 
Moduform, Inc. v. Harry H. Verkler Contractor, Inc., 681 N.E.2d 243 (Ind. App. 
1997), relied upon by McKell, is such a case involving a payment bond. Moduform is 
also distinguishable because there was no issue regarding whether a contractor's 
abandonment of work constituted final completion within the meaning of the bond 
statute. Also, the cases cited by the ALR annotation in support of the general rule 
include cases from Arizona, California, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Kansas, Minnesota, New Mexico, Oregon, and Virginia. 52 A.L.R.3d at 811-
812, n.35. 
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Carson also noted that there were two schools of thought as to what 
constitutes abandonment, one holding that mere cessation of work constitutes 
abandonment, and the other also requiring an intent to abandon: 
. . . Two schools of thought prevail as to when 
abandonment occurs. One view ... regards abandonment 
as a physical condition, not a mental act ...[and] ... 
actual cessation of the work, apart from any mental 
operations of the owner, constitutes and marks the time 
of abandonment where the work is not, in fact, resumed. 
Other courts apply [a rule which] declares that in order 
to constitute such abandonment ...there should be a 
cessation of operation, and an intent on the part of the 
owner and contractor to cease operations permanently, or 
at least for an indefinite period, or some fair notice to or 
knowledge of the abandonment by a lien claimant, either 
actual or implied. 
1994 Del. Super. LEXIS 74, *6-*7, quoting 52 ALR 3d at 804. 
In Carson, the court held that the lien claimant's statement of claim was 
untimely under either theory, pursuant to a statute that required the claim to be filed no 
earlier than '90 days from the completion of such structure contracted for by him,,8 and 
no later than 30 days after the expiration of the 90 day period. 1994 Del. Super. 
LEXIS 74, *3. As will be argued below, McKell's action is also untimely under either 
theory. 
8There is no analytical difference between statutes that measure the timeliness of a 
mechanic's lien claim from the completion of a building, structure or improvement, as 
in some states, or from the completion of the contract for such building, structure or 
improvement, as in Utah. 
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Another case following the general rule is Harper v. Galliher & Huguely, 
Inc., 29 F.2d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1928), cert, den., 278 U.S. 657 (1929), in which the 
mechanic's lien statute required the lien to be filed no later than three months after 
completion of the structure. Id. at 453, citing § 1239, D.C. Code. The general 
contractor abandoned the project before the structure was completed. Some of the 
subcontractors filed their liens more than three months after the general contractor 
abandoned the project, and the court held that the lien claims of these subcontractors 
were time barred: "... [T]he abandonment of the work by the original contractor is 
deemed in law to be a completion of it for the purpose of filing mechanics' liens by 
subcontractors and materialmen, and in such case the three months period begins to run 
at that date." Id. at 453. 
McKell argues that the term "final completion" in the Utah statute should be 
given a literal, dictionary definition.9 In responding to a similar argument, the court in 
Bethlehem Construction Co. v. Christiana Construction Co., 144 A. 830, 832 (Del. 
Super. 1928), responded as follows: 
It is insisted that the word "completion" in the statute 
must be given its ordinary and generally accepted 
meaning, and that, therefore, the statement of claim 
could not be filed until the structure was actually 
completed, no matter how long, or by whom, it was 
finished after the plaintiff discontinued work thereon. 
9Even if the Court were to accept McKell's argument, nothing could be more "finally 
complete" than abandonment, which is defined as: "to give up completely." Webster's 
New Collegiate Dictionary (G.&C. Merriam Co., 1977) (emphasis added). 
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But a strict construction does not mean an unreasonable 
or unwarranted construction. It cannot mean that the 
contractor can stop work for over 5 years, and after the 
property has been sold and completed by other persons, 
file his statement of claim. 
(emphasis added) See also, Projects Unlimited, supra, 798 P.2d at 752: '...[statutory] 
interpretations are to be avoided which render some part of a provision nonsensical or 
absurd.' (emphasis added) 
Here, McKell's interpretation of "final completion" is "nonsensical or 
absurd." Under that interpretation the 12 month period under § 38-1-1 l(l)(a) will 
never begin to run, because McKell will never complete the work for which it 
originally contracted. McKeirs counsel admitted as much at oral argument in the 
district court, by contending that as of that time (June 26, 2002, over 18 months after 
McKell ceased work), final completion still had not occurred (Tr. 20-21, Aple. 
Add. A). According to McKeirs interpretation, final completion still has not occurred 
as of the date of the filing of this brief (over two and one half years after McKell 
ceased work). 
McKeirs interpretation defeats the purpose of § 38-1-11, which, under AAA 
Fencing, supra, is not merely a statute of limitations, but a statute of repose designed to 
"...strictly [limit] the time during which property is encumbered..." 714 P.2d at 289. 
Rather than strictly limiting the time during which property is encumbered, McKell's 
interpretation makes that time period limitless. 
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In accordance with AAA Fencing, the district court here explained its ruling 
as follows: 
I think the plaintiff's theory countermands 
everything I understand the mechanics lien statutes to do. 
The goal of the mechanics lien statutes, statute [sic] and 
its subparts is to bring these matters to a head so that 
property owners, residential or not, can get liens taken 
care of if they are filed against them. . . 
(Tr. 42, Aple. Add. A, emphasis added) Thus, the district court's interpretation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(l)(a), equating cessation and abandonment of work with 
"final completion" of the contract under the statute, should be affirmed. 
IL THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED, 
BASED ON THE UNDISPUTED FACTS, THAT 
McKELL DID NOT FILE THIS ACTION TO 
ENFORCE ITS MECHANIC'S LIEN WITHIN 12 
MONTHS AFTER McKELL CEASED AND 
ABANDONED THE WORK TO BE PERFORMED 
UNDER THE CONTRACT 
McKell erroneously contends that the district court did not find that McKell 
ceased or abandoned work. To the contrary, in Conclusion of Law No. 18 (R.85), the 
court found that McKell ceased work on October 5, 2000:10 
18. McKell last furnished work on the Real 
Property on October 5, 2000. The twelve (12) month 
period during which McKell was required to file an 
action to enforce its lien began to run on October 6, 2000 
and ended on October 5, 2001. 
To the extent Conclusion of Law No. 18 is a mislabeled finding of fact, this 
mislabeling is irrelevant. See, Zions First National Bank, NA. v. National American 
Title Ins, Co., 749 P.2d 651, 656 (Utah 1988). 
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Alternatively, the district court found that McKell abandoned the work no 
later than November 2, 2000, once it became clear to McKell that Carter would not or 
could not pay for the work McKell had already completed, and McKell recorded its 
notice of lien (Erickson Aff., f 10, R. 97, Aplt. Add. h): 
So I think based on the statute as written, although I 
think it's a little vague, and on the earlier case law I 
think it's very clear that 12 months from the date of 
completion of the original contract in this matter under 
these facts has to relate back to the filing of the 
mechanics lien which was when the plaintiff decided it 
was not going to get paid. 
And the plaintiff's affidavit states in the one 
paragraph: 
"Plaintiff negotiated with Carter in an 
attempt to receive payment for work 
performed prior to October 5th, 2000. When 
Carter would not or could not pay for the 
portion of work completed, McKell recorded a 
mechanics lien". 
At that point they gave up and did no more work, 
they called it good. 
* # * 
And I think the date that we have to look at, I 
mean, either way they lose, we either look at October 5th 
or we look at November 2nd when the lien was filed. 
And either way their action was filed more than a year 
later on the 21st of November, 2000. 
-16-
(Tr. 43-44, Aple. Add. A, emphasis added)11 
McKell also argues that the issue of whether it abandoned the project is a 
factual issue, citing Ketchum, supra, 784 P.2d at 1225. However, McKell may not 
raise this issue on appeal, because it never raised the issue in the district court 
(R. 58-66; Tr. generally). See, Hart, supra. Instead, at oral argument in the district 
court, McKell argued only that the issue of whether final completion had occurred, 
according to its interpretation of this phrase (i. e., completion of all work originally 
called for by the contract) was a factual issue (Tr. 28, Aple. Add. A). 
Even if McKell had preserved for appeal its argument that abandonment 
presents a factual issue, the facts of Ketchum are distinguishable. For example, 
Ketchum noted: "In the case before us, the record is not clear when work ceased on the 
project." 784 P.2d at 1226. Here, the evidence in the record is undisputed that work 
ceased on October 5, 2000 (Erickson Aft, 1 6, R. 98, Aplt. Add. h). 
In Ketchum, the work stopped and then resumed (784 P.2d at 1219, 1226), 
and the court held: ". . .[T]he fact that a building project may be temporarily halted 
does not necessarily mean that an abandonment has occurred." (Id. at 1225, emphasis 
added) Here, it is undisputed that McKell never resumed work on the project after 
October 5, 2000 (Erickson Aff., 1 11, R. 97, Aplt. Add. A). 
nThe court misspoke as to the filing date of this action, which was November 21, 
2001. 
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Also, even if intent to abandon is required, that intent has also been 
established here, based upon the undisputed facts. Paragraph 12 of the Erickson Aff. 
claimed that McKell intended to complete the project upon payment for past work and 
assurance of payment for future work (R. 97, Aplt. Add h). 
However, Paragraph 10 of the Erickson Aff. concedes that the reason McKell 
recorded its notice of lien on November 2, 2000, was because it had negotiated with 
Carter concerning payment for McKell's past work, those negotiations had failed, and 
McKell knew, as of November 2, 2000, that "Carter would not or could not pay for the 
portion of work completed," let alone pay for any future work. (R. 97, Aplt. Add. h) 
Thus, the Erickson Aff. does not contend that McKell's negotiations with Carter 
continued after November 2, 2000, and abandonment occurred no later than that date, 
as the district court alternatively ruled. 
Accordingly, the undisputed facts establish that McKell ceased work on 
October 5, 2000, abandoned the project no later than November 2, 2000, and that this 
action filed on November 21, 2001 was therefore time barred by the 12-month statute 
ofrepose in § 38-1-1 l(l)(a). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the district court's Amended Order should be 
affirmed. Also, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1), Wells Fargo should be 
awarded its attorney fees and costs as the successful party on this appeal, in amounts to 
be determined by the district court on remand. 
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PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
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Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee, 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT - PROVO COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
R.A. MCKELL EXCAVATING, 
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CARTER CONSTRUCTION, et al, 
Defendant. 
Case 010405004 
Appeal 2002716-SC CO 
O 
Judge Claudia Laycock ^ 
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BE IT REMEMBERED that this matter came on for hearing 
before the above-named court on June 26, 2002. 
WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by 
counsel, the following proceedings were held: 
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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 
(June 26, 2002) 
THE JUDGE: Thank you. Please be seated. 
Okay. We are here in the matter of McKell 
Excavating versus Carter Construction, etcetera. But we're 
actually here on I think the bank's motion. 
MR. CALL: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Now let's have counsel state your, 
your appearance for the record. 
MR. REED: I'm Jack Reed representing the 
plaintiff McKell Excavating. 
MR. CALL: Randall Call appearing on behalf of 
Wells Fargo, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Now, this is actually 
the bank's motion for a judgment on the pleadings. 
All right. Gentlemen, why don't you go ahead. 
Mr. Call? 
MR. CALL: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Let me just make sure I understand the 
end goal here. If I were to grant your motion it would in 
effect dismiss the first claim for relief as to all parties 
because that claim is only going for the valid lien, it seeks 
to have the lien established and adjudge this valid. And 
then by doing that in effect it would take the bank out 
entirely because you would have nothing else at risk. 
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MR. CALL: Correct, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
ARGUMENT BY MR. CALL 
MR. CALL: Our, our motion is based upon the 
pleadings. And I recognize that there's been an affidavit 
filed by a, the plaintiff in this case, a counteraffidavit, 
but so I think the Court can consider that affidavit and, and 
do this as a motion for summary judgment. I think even with 
the affidavit that has been filed it doesn't change a, the 
basic facts. 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. CALL: And I don't believe there are any 
disputed facts. And the facts are, are fairly simple as 
we've set forth in the memorandum. And I'm not going to 
repeat what's in the memorandum but— 
THE JUDGE: Well what, what I would like you 
to do as a beginning, why don't, why don't I just have you 
list what you view as the undisputed facts and let's see if 
there is an agreement between the parties as to what the 
facts are. 
MR. CALL: Sure. Your Honor, I think the 
undisputed facts are that a, the plaintiff, R.A. McKell 
Excavating, Inc. commenced, entered into a contract with 
Carter Construction or Carter Development in order to perform 
some services on real property located in Utah County, I 
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is their right. And that's not unusual in the construction 
industry. They have problems with payment. It's not 
unusual in the construction industry for payment to be slow. 
It's not unusual for a contractor to negotiate with an owner 
and try and get those payments current and, and for work to 
slow down and in some cases stop. But that is not 
synonymous with final completion as we, as is commonly 
understood. 
The lien does not state that final completion 
occurred on October 5, 2000. The lien says the last day of 
work was October 5, 2000. And it says that because that's 
what the statute requires. 38-1-7 says that in order to 
have a, and valid mechanics lien you have to include certain 
things in the notice and two of those things are the first 
day of work and the last day of work, last day of work. But 
it doesn't say final completion date. And nowhere does the 
lien say that final completion was October 5, 2000. 
The complaint does not say that final completion 
occurred on October 5, 2000. 
So nowhere in the pleadings and nowhere in the lien 
has McKell stated and has the bank admitted that final 
completion occurred on October 5, 2000 because it simply 
didn't happen. 
THE JUDGE: So when did it occur? 
MR. REED: It hasn't occurred. It hasn't 
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occurred. And let me address that issue. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. Because it seems to me your, 
your theory is this thing could float out there for years. 
MR. REED: Well— 
THE JUDGE: There would be no statute of 
limitations. 
MR. REED: It could, it could certainly float for 
an extended period of time. But this is what the, an owner 
can do if they want to, if they want to fix that. If you 
get to a point where, as in this situation, where work up to 
a certain point is completed but there is still work to be 
done and you don't have the money to pay for that, what an 
owner does is writes a deductive change order and deducts 
that work out of the contract and then sends a letter off to 
the contractor saying we are taking this work out of your 
contract, we're deducting this amount from the contract 
amount, we don't owe it to you anymore, you're done. And 
that didn't happen here. At least there's no evidence 
before the Court to indicate that that happened here. 
The evidence is to the contrary. The evidence is 
that the McKell tried to work with the owner to insure that 
the project could go forward and that McKell would get paid, 
and the owner was unable to meet the conditions satisfying 
payment. 
So while it's theoretically possible that this date 
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specified in the statute, and which the legislature didn't 
set forth. The legislature started the clock running on 
final completion of the original contract. And we, we 
submit that that's what the statute means. It does not mean 
a substantial completion. 
In conclusion we think the bank's motion should be 
denied because the bank is not clearly entitled to judgment. 
And there are, the material fact about what happened on 
October 5 was the, was the project, was the project finally 
completed at that time or not? That's the last day of work, 
yes, but was the contract finally completed on October 5, was 
McKell's contract with Carter Development finally completed 
on October 5 is a question of fact. The inference is if the 
Court adopts the, the standard articulated by the Utah courts 
that inference needs to be construed in the favor of McKell 
that the contract was not finally completed on October 5, 
therefore, the mechanics lien is timely, or at least there is 
a question of fact and, therefore, the bank's motion should 
be denied. 
THE JUDGE: Why, why should McKell's filing of the 
mechanics, mechanics lien less than a month later on November 
2nd, 2000 not be construed by the Court as they're calling it 
quits and the contract, whatever they were going to do on 
that contract was now complete? 
MR. REED: Because there, there is a variety of 
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I'm not as sure as Mr. Call that the definition of 
residence doesn't apply. But that doesn't seem to be argued 
by either party so I'll give that one up. It would be the 
easy way out for me, frankly. But a, since the parties 
don't think they were residences yet I won't go that way. 
The issue is whether or not we have a date of final 
completion of the original contract. It is clear to me that 
as contemplated originally by the parties the contract was 
not completed. However, I am persuaded by Mr. Call's 
arguments as to the interpretation of final completion 
requiring some finality to it. 
I think the plaintiff's theory countermands 
everything I understand the mechanics lien statutes to do. 
The goal of the mechanics lien statutes, statute and its 
subparts is to bring these matters to a head so that property 
owners, residential or not, can get liens taken care of if 
they are filed against them, and so that the lien claimants 
don't have to wait forever. And I think the theory espoused 
by the plaintiff would mean that number one, the lien 
claimant would always have a subjective, subjective power to 
call the contract complete, and number two, by Mr. Call's 
theory would preclude the lien claimant from ever filing a, 
the action if the original contract was never completed. It 
would force the lien claimant into going ahead somehow and 
completing the contract just in order to file his action. 
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And to me that makes absolutely no sense. 
I see nothing i.i i.ne S I J JL-. ::^I, p:-.,viUT_ 
what M* . Reed has suggested that : r^  ou!-"r to bring things lo 
change the contract ;• 's 'iot : r, the statute, /.rx 
11 1 e • o w n e r i: e a ] 1 y 1 I a s •w o i I t: : • ;,< i a i I t t : d c 11 I a t e , i i i a 
case like this where the owner is apparently not doing well 
financially. 
So I think based on the statute as written, 
d_LLrK . 'hi'-]- _Lt!s a iitt.1 e vague; and on the earl i er case 
lav/ 1 Mi: ik ^L ^ very clear that 12 months from the date of 
completion of i h••• oricliMl. contract in this matter under 
. ' ^  > . • c '. L :: • : b a c k t: • : 11 I e • f :i ] i i I g : f 11: I e i n e c I: I a i i i c s 
Lien v.r; ::•!-: \-:.<.y -;.:--n i:io pi aintiff decided it was not going to 
And l.hf-; plaintiff's affidavit states in the one 
p.jrac;: uph : 
"Plaintiff negotiated with Carter in an 
atfemnf I • receive payment for work 
periormed prio: n. 0cLoo^r >; t • , 2000. 
When Carter would no* or could not pay 
for to:--- J}I;LU-.,. on [ ;.L -O - r el ] 
recorded n mechanics ;i- *". 
• ai id :i:i d i i, :> n tor e v, • : i: k, 
they called it good. 
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And so I thi nk as far as this plaintiff was 
concerned t h a t c o i 111: a c t f o i 11 i e i i: :i i t • E I t s a i i d p i I i: p o s e s w a s 
completed on October 5th and they went ahead and filed their 
niechani cs ] :i ei i. 
This action before me is an action to perfect \ha\ 
) i e i :i ' - . - - ' • : • j 
statute: 
!M jLXeii c l a i m a n t .shall " 1 1 ^ an a c t i o n t o 
e n f o r c e t h e l i e n t u u . J u.^x,; n i s 
o h a p t ^ 
i:i^L - , re ..' LL. pi . i, • Tl i a t i s t i le 
ve ry l i e n : riat was f i l e d . There w-re r; , ^ t h e : l i e n s f i l e d . 
- : • • - , J ool ;:  at, I 
mean, either way they lose, we either look a: October 5th or 
we ] ool : a ! • , * * .-q. And ei ther 
way their action was liied more than a year rater on the 21st 
of November, 2000. 
It's a vague statute. It could be better 
written. Subparagraph (b) I think is much better written, 
much more clear because it states specitieally; 
"from the date the lien clain lant 
1 a s t p e r f o r m e d .1 a b o r a i I d s e i: v :i c e s , o r 
last furnished equipment or materiaL" 
I (* -n T *'-a; 
helps me define the ambiguities in subparagraph (a), < : t' 
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Bayard. P.O Box 272. Georgetown. ' V l o o ^ 
••"•w„«. ** . . arncii LL Inquire ilriuti D. Shirey, 
.squire, Tunneli & Taysor, P.O. Box 151. Georgetown, 
«)ei iOlM7 
J UDGES: 
GRAVES 
i ?MONBY: 
T.HFNI.EY GRAVES 
dismiss piaintiii s iv c -J tumplaint and >.... .-.Miff«- *:i 
personam action. This Court has accepted plaintiffs weil-
pleaded allegations as true, and for the reasons set forth 
below, defendant's motion is granted pursuant to Superior 
Court Civil Rule i 2(b)(6). n! 
nl Defen- es not set for th a statutory 
basis for the . n. The Court recognizes 
Superior Court Civil R . 12(b)(6) as the 
appropriate legal vehicle W: ine purposes of this 
proceeding 
FACTS 
' I he subject of this proceeding is residential beach 
property located at 113 Oakwood Avenue, Bethany Beach, 
Delaware. The property is titled in the name of a 
Washington, D.C. corporation known as Mott & 
Associates, P.C. ("Mott" or "defendant"), Randy Mott is 
the sole shareholder [*2] of Mott & Associates. In early 
1992, Mott and his wife, Debi Mott, contracted with 
Carson Construction & Design, Inc. ("Carson" or 
"plaintiff) to renovate and remodel the beach property. 
Debi Mott was to work on the home as an interior designer, 
and Carson was to work as the general contractor for 
construction. Carson commenced work on February 17, 
1992. By the spring of that year, the relationship between 
Randy Mott, Debi Mott and Carson had deteriorated due to 
Randy Mott's belief that he was being overtoiled, 
defrauded and cuckolded by Debi Mott and Carson. Mott 
& Associates had remitted payments totaling $ 65,000 to 
Carson. However, Randy Mott refused to pay additional 
amounts demanded after June of 1992. The last date of 
delivery of materials and furnishing of labor by Carson 
occurred on June 17, 1992. Carson stopped working after 
June 1.7, 1992 because of nonpayment. The renovations to 
the beach property were never completed. 
On September 4, 1992, Randy Mott filed a civil action 
for fraud and conversion against Debi Mott and Carson in 
the Superior Court; of the District of Columbia. 
Approximately one week later, Randy Mott had the locks 
to the beach property changed. On October [*3] 15,1992,, 
Carson's counsel received from Randy Mott 
communication definitively precluding further work by 
Carson. In the complaint, plaintiff alleges that constructive 
completion occurred upon receipt of this communication. 
On November 13,1992, Carson filed the within complaint 
and statement of claim for a mechanics' lien on amounts 
past due. 
DISCUSSION 
Defendant seeks dismissal of plaintiff s complaint on 
the basis that plaintiffs complaint and statement of claim 
were not filed timely. The Delaware mechanics' lien 
statute, 25 Del.C § 2711(a) provides; 
"- contractor who (1) has made his contract directly with 
Pas;c 2 
1994 Del Super. LEXIS 74, * 
the owner or reputed owner of any structure and (2) has 
furnished both labor and material in and for such structure 
shall file no statement of claim until after the expiration of 
90 days from the completion of such structure contracted 
for by him; but such contractor, in order to avail himself of 
the benefits of this subchapter, shall file his statement ol 
claim within 10 davs after the expiration of the 90 LLU 
period 
I he hd.iwttte mechanics' lien statute is silent as to 
noncompletion. The courts, however, have adapted to such 
circumstances by applying the concept [*4] of 
"constructive completion." For instance, when the 
performance of the contract is on a certain date rendered 
impossible through no fault of the contractor, or where 
there is permanent abandonment of the work, there is then 
constructive completion, and the contractor must file his 
tatement of claim within 30 days after the expiration of 90 
days from that date. Bethlehem Construction Co. v 
Christiana Construction Co., Del. Super., 34 Del. 147, 144 
A. 830 (1928). 
Plaintiff argues that the mechanics' lien statute cannot 
be strictly construed because it does not provide guidance 
for filing in cases where there is no certain date of 
constructive completion. Plaintiff offers no definitive "date 
certain" for constructive completion. Rather, plaintiff 
recognizes three date^ of significance 
1 i lulv 1992: defendant stops payment 
2.) September 7-10, 1992: defendant changes tin kit L un 
the home thus precluding entry by plaintiff 
3.) October 15, 1992: plaintiffs attorney is notified that 
plaintiff is no longer authorized to work on the beach home 
Plaintiff suggests that the November U, 1992 complaint 
was timely filed [*5] 30 days after the October 15, 1992 
notice from defendant, plaintiff maintains that once notice 
was given, there was no reason to wait for the 90 day 
statutory period since the last date of performance was 
June 17, 1992, and the time for subcontractor filing had 
lapsed See 25 Del C § 2111(h). 
I. Constructive Completion Occurs at Abandonment. 
In the case at bar, completion can be said to have 
occurred when Carson abandoned work on the beach 
property The Delaware case ol Ik if lit hem Construction 
Co v Christiana Construction Co, supra is cited for this 
proposition by Maurice T. Brunner, LL.B. in Abandonment 
of Construction or of Contract as Affecting Time for Filing 
Mechanics' Liens or Time for Giving Notice to ()wuer, 52 
4 L R 3d T (JQ73) Mr. Brunner states: 
ihere is bioad dtillnnih tor a general rule that 
abandonment is the equ i tilt nt of completion for purposes 
of the mechanics' lien statutes; and under statutes which 
require the notice, claim or statement of mechanics' lien to 
be filed within a certain time after completion of the 
building or improvement, it is, apart from slight authority 
1 *6] to the contrary, very generally held or recognized that 
where the building or improvement is not completed but 
work is abandoned thereon, abandonment of the work is 
equivalent to completion for the purposes of the statute, 
and that the filing both may and, in order to be timely, 
must be made within the statutory period after such 
abandonment. 
Defining abandonment m«i\ prove problematic Mt 
Brunner explains: 
Abandonment of work will not be presumed where the 
right to a mechanics' lien ts in question, but must be 
established by the evidence ... the courts are not in accord 
as to what constitutes abandonment. Two schools of 
thought prevail as to when abandonment occur > One \ lew 
... regards abandonment as a physical condition, not a 
mental act... [and] ... actual cessation of the work, apart 
If oni am mental operations of the owner, constitutes and 
marks the time of abandonment where the work is not, in 
fact, resumed. Other courts apply [a rule which] declares 
that in order to constitute such abandonment ... there 
should be a cessation of operation, and an intent on the part 
of the owner and contractor to cease operations 
permanently, or at least for an indefinite period, [*7] or 
some fair notice to or knowledge of the abandonment by a 
lien claimant, either actual or implied. 
Delaware is silent as to its definition oi abandonment. 
However, plaintiffs claim fails under either view. 25 
Del.C § 2711(a) establishes a thirty day window in which 
a mechanics' lien must be filed. Under the first view, 
abandonment would have occurred on June 17,1992, when 
plaintiff actually and physically stopped work on the beach 
property. The November 13, 1992 filing would then have 
been approximately one month late. Under the second 
view, abandonment could have occurred either during the 
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week in September when Randy Mott changed the locks on 
the beach property, thereby evidencing his intent to 
permanently preclude further work by Carson, or on 
October 15, 1992, when Randy Mott informed Carson's 
counsel that Carson no longer had authority to work on the 
beach property In either case, the November 13, 1002 
filing by plaintiff would have been too early. 
11. fhe Necessity of Strict Statutory Construction. 
Delaware law is rich with the mandate that the 
mechanics' 1 ien statute be strictly construed. Department of 
Community Affairs and Economic Development v M 
Davis & Sons, Inc., Del. Supr., 412A.2d939 (1980); 1*81 
Gould, Inc. v. Dynalectric Co., Del. Super., 435 A.2d 730 
(1981); Silverside Home Mart, Inc. v. Hall, Del. Super, 
345A.2d427 (1975); lannottiv. Kalmbacher, Del. Super 
34 Del. 600, 156 A. 366 (1935); Bethlehem Construction 
Co. v. Christiana Construction Co., Del. Super., 34 Del 
147, 144 4 830 (1928), In re Long, Del. Super, 27 Del 
88, 86 A 104 (1913i 
1 he necessity for compliance w iilislalutoiy piovisioiio 
is addressed in S3 Am. Jur. id. Mechanics' Liens § 168 
(1970): 
Mechanics' liens are purely statutory, have no existence 
without the statute that controls their perfecting and 
\ nlurcing, and are obtainable only by those who can meet 
the statutory requisites. They can be acquired only in the 
manner and on the conditions prescribed in the statute, and 
the essential elements of a statute prescribing the 
conditions upon which the remedy may be obtained are 
mandatory and not merely directory 
Moreover, it is settled in Delaware that the validity of a 
mechanics' lien depends f*9] upon an affirmative showing 
that every essential statutory step in the creation of the lien 
has been duly taken. E. J. Hollingsworth Co. v. 
Continental-DiamondF. Co., Del. Super., 36Del 303, 175 
A. 266 (1934). The statutory provisions are mandatory, and 
the inability to comply with the statute means that a lien 
cannot be obtained because "the Court has no power to 
create exceptions where none exist." Warner Co. v. 
Lecdom Construction Co., Del. Super, 4^ Del 4^, 93 
i 2d 316, 319(1952). 
CONCLUSION 
Given the above, this Court finds that plaintiff failed 
lo establish a date of completion which would meet the 
statutory requirements for filing mechanics' a lini 
Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's in 
rem complaint is GRANTED, With regard to plaintiffs in 
personam claim, this Court has the inherent power to stay 
proceedings in control of its docket after balancing 
competing interests. Insurance Co. ofN. Am. v. Steigler, 
Pel Super, 300 A 2d 16 (1972), affd, 306 A.2d 742 
(1973) Since this Court [*10] has disposed of plaintiffs 
in rem complaint, it would be inefficient and duplicative to 
hear plaintiffs in personam claim. The District of 
< nlnmbia action was commenced two months prior to the 
piesent action and has now progressed to the arbitration 
stage. The parties reside and conduct business in or near 
the Washington, D.C. area, and the Superior Court of the 
District of Columbia has properly acquired jurisdiction 
UH J the disputed renovations. Defendant's motion to stay 
plaintiffs in personam claim pending resolution of the 
District of Columbia suit is therefore GRANTED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
T Ilenle\ Groves 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
RAYMOND MICHAEL QUINTANA, : Case No. 20030534-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is a consolidated appeal from the denial of a motion to withdraw guilty pleas 
in two cases against the same defendant, which pleas were entered to two counts of 
burglary, second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (Supp. 2002) 
(statute attached in Addendum A).1 This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
!The appellate record in this matter includes the individual record for each of the 
two consolidated appeals: district court case numbers 021911211 and 021911684. 
Because the records are largely duplicative of each other, the State cites primarily to the 
record in case number 021911211 by page and volume number (not case number). 
Citation to the record in case no. 021911684 is included only where necessary and begins 
with the last four digits of the case number, i.e., (R. 1684/pleading page) or (R. 
1684/volume:page). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
This appeal presents the sole issue of whether the trial court properly denied as 
untimely defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas after the judge had informed 
defendant that he must file any such motion before sentencing, and defendant filed his 
motion three days after sentencing. 
This issue presents a question of law which this Court reviews for correctness. See 
State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App. 186, <[} 6, 5 P.3d 1222, overruled on other grounds, 
State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, 31 P.3d 528. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
The following statutory and rule provisions are relevant to the issue raised on 
appeal and are attached in Addendum C: 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (2003); 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant in two cases with a total of eleven second-degree 
felony burglaries, two third-degree felony attempted burglaries, five second-degree felony 
thefts, one third-degree felony theft, four class A misdemeanor thefts, and one class A 
misdemeanor cruelty to animals, all of which arose from a series of incidents occurring 
between August 21 and September 23, 2002 (R. 1-11; R. 1684/2-3). Fingerprints found at 
the scene of two of the crimes matched defendant's (R. 10; R. 1684/3). The trial court 
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appointed counsel, and, following a preliminary hearing, bound defendant over on all 
charges (R. docket at 2-5; R. 36-38; R. 1684/11-13). At a hearing on April 21, 2003, after 
three trial dates had been continued, defendant waived the jury (R. docket at 5-9; R. 42, 
63-66, 80-85, 90-91; R. 1684/docket at 4-8; R. 1684/17-18,35-37,42). The court set 
back-to-back bench trials for May 8, 2003 (R. docket at 9; R. 90; R. 1684/docket at 8; R. 
1684/81:4). 
The parties and the witnesses appeared on the morning of trial (R. 127:7). 
However, defendant decided that morning to enter guilty pleas in both cases (R. 126:4). 
Defense counsel explained that defendant would plead guilty to a single charge of 
second-degree burglary in each case for the charges allegedly involving his fingerprints 
(R. 127:1) (the transcript of the plea colloquy is attached as Addendum D). In return, 
the prosecution would seek to dismiss the remaining charges and would recommend 
concurrent sentencing on both offenses (R. 92-99; R. 127:5). Add. D. The trial court 
engaged in a detailed colloquy with defendant, insuring that he understood the rights he 
had and was giving up by entering his pleas, that he was not under the influence of 
anything or anyone, that he had been given ample time to discuss the plea details with his 
counsel and was satisfied with his counsel's representation, and that counsel had 
answered all of his questions (R. 92-99; R. 127:2-5). Add. D. Defense counsel produced 
an unsigned affidavit in support of the plea, and the court reviewed the factual basis for 
each plea (R. 92-99; R. 127:3, 5). Add. D. Defense counsel assured the trial judge that 
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he had discussed the affidavit with defendant, he believed that defendant understood its 
contents, and the affidavit contained true and accurate declarations made by the defendant 
(R. 97; R. 127:1-2). Add. D. The trial judge completed the colloquy, incorporated the 
plea affidavit, accepted defendant's guilty pleas, then invited defendant to sign the plea 
affidavit: 
THE COURT: And you can sign that if you haven't done that 
already. We'll have you execute that now and that will be further evidence 
that you understand your rights and the charges and the consequences or 
penalties to you. You have up until the time of sentencing to move to 
withdraw the plea for good cause. 
And I'm assuming we need [a] pre-sentence report if for nothing 
more than restitution amounts. 
(R. 127:5). Add. D. 
Defense counsel responded by requesting that defendant be sentenced on both 
cases on May 12-four days away. Defense counsel explained his reasoning: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, in this particular matter, Mr. 
Quintana went to jury trial in another burglary under Judge Reese, 
approximately a month ago[,] and his sentencing is set for Monday in front 
of Judge Reese. [A p]re-sentence report has already been prepared. I am 
asking you to send these two cases to Judge Reese for sentencing. Mr. 
Quintana agrees and will stipulate to the restitution on these matters[,] and I 
don't think that there's anything necessary needful [sic] to get on these 
particular matters[,] and Mr. Quintana would like to get going. So what 
we're asking the Court to do is send these two to Judge Reese for 
sentencing[,] although the other is set for Monday next. 
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(R. 127:6).2 Add. D. The trial judge granted the request, but set sentencing in this case 
for June 2 in case Judge Reese declined to take both matters (R. 127:6-7). Add. D. 
On May 12, defendant appeared for sentencing before Judge Reese on all three 
matters (R. 126) (a copy of the sentencing transcript is attached in Addendum E). The 
prosecutor made the promised recommendation, gave some background on the plea 
bargain, and highlighted several points in the presentence investigation report: defendant 
admitted to filing the palms of his hands along with the fingers, he "appears to lack even 
those basic abilities needed to function on a daily basis outside of prison[,]" he is a danger 
to himself and the community with his heroin addiction, he escaped a juvenile detention 
center by use of a firearm, he has a "very, very lengthy history of adult crime[,]" he failed 
to successfully complete any of the eight paroles he had been granted, and he was picked 
up on nineteen felonies in the four years and seven months he spent outside of prison 
during his adult life (R. 126: 5-6). Add. E. 
Judge Reese ultimately sentenced defendant to the Utah State Prison for a term of 
one-to-fifteen years for each of the three second-degree felony burglary convictions, with 
the sentences to run consecutively to each other (R. 102-03; R. 126:9-10). 
Three days later—on May 15, 2003—defendant filed a motion with Judge 
McCleve, seeking wlo withdraw his guilty pleas[,]" but giving no basis or explanation for 
2The matter before Judge Reese was another second-degree felony burglary (R. 
102-03; R. 126:9-10). 
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the motion, and including no memorandum of points and authorities (R. 104-05).3 The 
State responded the next day, noting that, under the statute in effect at the time the pleas 
were entered, defendant's motion was untimely, robbing the court of jurisdiction to 
entertain it (R. 107-09), Defendant filed no response to the State's argument and, on May 
27. the Judge McCleve entered an order denying defendant's motion as untimely (R. 110) 
(attached in Addendum F). Defendant timely appealed from that denial (R. 112-13). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS4 
Between August 21 and September 23, 2002, burglaries and thefts occurred or 
were attempted at twelve different residential locations (R. 1-11; R. 1684/2-3). Most of 
the entries had been accomplished by use of vice grips, channel-locks, or pliers on 
doorknobs during the daytime while the occupants were not home (R. 7-11; R. 1684/5). 
Fingerprints retrieved from two locations matched defendant's (R. 10; R. 1684/3). On 
September 20, the State charged defendant with ten counts of burglary, two counts of 
attempted burglary, nine counts of theft, and one count of cruelty to animals for the 
torture death of a cat at one of the burglary sites (R. 22-32). All offenses giving rise to 
these charges occurred between August 21 and September 13, and defendant's 
fingerprints were found at one location (id.). On October 9, the State charged defendant 
3No motion to withdraw appears in the pleading file for case number 021911684, 
but the one filed in case number 021911211 has both case numbers on it (R. 104-05). 
4The facts are taken from the affidavit of defendant submitted in support of his 
guilty pleas, statements made during the plea colloquy and the sentencing hearing, and the 
information and probable cause statements filed in each case. 
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with one count each of burglary and theft for an offense which occurred on September 23 
and at which his fingerprints were found (R. 1684:2-3). 
In the course of sentencing, defendant explained that his conduct was the result of 
his need to finance his long-term heroin habit (R. 126:7-8). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The statutory deadline for filing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea changed three 
days before entry of defendant's pleas. The plea affidavit referred to the old deadline. 
This Court should reject defendant's claim that the trial judge did not adequately inform 
him of the time limit for filing a motion to withdraw his pleas because: 1) the untimely 
motion robs this Court of jurisdiction to review his claim that the trial court did not 
comply with rule 11(e)(7), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; 2) the trial court expressly 
informed him at the plea hearing of the proper deadline under the newly-amended statute, 
and the filing of an untimely motion thereafter robbed the trial court of jurisdiction to 
consider the motion or to extend the time for filing it. 
Even assuming that the trial court should have inquired further to ensure that 
defendant was not confused by the inaccurate deadline contained in his plea affidavit, 
such error would not require reversal where defendant invited it. Both defendant and his 
counsel assured the judge that they had reviewed the affidavit and that defendant 
understood its contents. Defense counsel also certified that the statements in the affidavit 
were true and accurate to the best of his knowledge. Neither defendant nor his counsel 
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voiced any confusion or concern about the deadline, giving the trial judge no reason to 
inquire further. Consequently, any error in the trial court's failure to clarify the time limit 
in the affidavit does not warrant reversal. 
Finally, defendant's claim fails on appeal because rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, does not mandate that the trial court extend the time to file the withdrawal 
motion when a defendant is not properly informed of the deadline. The permissive 
language of the rule permits the trial court some discretion in extending the filing 
deadline. Any error on the trial court's part in this case in not elaborating on the fling 
deadline should not be grounds for extending the deadline where defendant was told the 
correct information in open court, and any mistake as to the deadline is attributable to 
himself or to his counsel. 
ARGUMENT 
BECAUSE THE TRIAL JUDGE INFORMED DEFENDANT OF THE 
APPROPRIATE DEADLINE FOR FILING A MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW HIS PLEAS, THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
DEFENDANT'S UNTIMELY MOTION FOR LACK OF 
JURISDICTION; ALTERNATIVELY, DEFENDANT INVITED ANY 
ERROR 
Defendant contends that the trial court improperly denied as untimely his motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas and that he is entitled to a remand to have a hearing on his 
motion. Br. of Aplt. at 8-15. He claims that the statute providing the deadline for filing 
such a motion changed "during plea negotiations," that he was "not informed" of the 
appropriate deadline so long as the misstatement in the affidavit remained unaddressed, 
and that he is entitled to additional time to file the motion under rule 11(f), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. Id. at 8-10. However, where defendant filed an untimely motion to 
withdraw, where he was informed by the trial judge of the proper deadline, or, 
alternatively, where he invited any error below, he cannot succeed on his appellate claim. 
A. Statutory Background 
Prior to May 5, 2003, Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) provided that "A request to 
withdraw a plea of guilty . . . shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (1999). A guilty plea was entered upon sentencing. See 
State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, f 11, 31 P.3d 528. Consequently, a defendant had thirty days 
after sentencing to file a motion to withdraw his plea. See State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, f3, 
40 P.3d 630 (failure to file a motion to withdraw within thirty days of entry of the plea 
"extinguishes a defendant's right to challenge the validity of the guilty plea on appeal."). 
This is the deadline that is contained in the plea affidavit (R. 97) (a copy of the affidavit is 
attached in Addendum G). 
On May 5, the 2003 amendment to the statute became effective and provided: 
A request to withdraw a plea of guilty . . . shall be made by motion before 
sentence is announced. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (2)(b) (2003) (attached in Addendum C). This is the deadline 
announced by the trial judge in open court during the plea colloquy (R. 127:5). 
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B. Defendant's Claim Fails Where the Judge Stated the Correct Time Limit: 
Alternatively, Defendant Invited Any Error 
1. Defendant was informed of the proper deadline, defeating his claim 
Under the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, ^  3-4, 
where a defendant does not timely move to withdraw his guilty pleas within the time 
advised by the trial court, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to address the issue of 
whether the lower court strictly complied with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which identifies the information the 
trial judge must find before he accepting a plea as voluntarily and knowingly entered, 
provides that the judge must ensure that "the defendant has been advised of the time 
limits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(7). Add. C. 
In this case, the trial judge expressly informed defendant during the plea colloquy, 
uYou have up until the time of sentencing to move to withdraw the plea for good cause" 
(R. 127:5). This was an accurate statement of the law in existence at the time the guilty 
pleas were entered, and the judge made the statement to defendant in open court (id). 
Defendant acknowledges the fact that the trial court expressly informed him of the 
deadline at the plea colloquy and that his motion to withdraw his pleas below was three 
days late. Br. of Aplt. at 5, 7-11. However, he minimizes these points, stressing instead 
the deadline set forth in the plea affidavit and the fact that he filed his motion within that 
erroneous period of time. Id. 
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Because defendant in fact filed his motion outside the time allowed by statute, this 
Court is without jurisdiction to address on appeal defendant's claim that the trial court did 
not comply with rule 11(e)(7), and the appeal should be dismissed. See Reyes, 2002 UT 
13, ™! 3-4 (failure to file a timely motion to withdraw robs the appellate court of 
jurisdiction to review whether the trial court complied with rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure); State v. Brooks, 2003 UT App 84, 2003 WL 21282559 (citing 
Reyes. 2002 UT 13, f3) (attached in Addendum B). But see State v. Swensen, 1999 UT 
App 340, 1999 WL 33244784 (because defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, this 
Court has jurisdiction to review the district court's denial of the motion to withdraw the 
plea) (attached in Addendum B). See also Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, f 16, 
44 P.3d 734, 739 (unpublished memorandum decisions "may be presented . . . as 
persuasive authority . . . so long as all parties and the court are supplied with accurate 
copies at the time the decision is first cited"). 
Moreover, because defendant admits that the trial court in fact complied with rule 
11(e)(7) by properly informing him of the deadline for filing his motion to withdraw, this 
Court should affirm the denial of his motion. Defendant's untimely motion, filed after the 
trial court's express statement of the deadline, robbed the trial court of jurisdiction to 
consider defendant's motion or to extend the time for filing it, and defendant's appeal 
fails. See State v. Canfield, 917 P.2d 561, 562 (Utah App. 1996) (addressing a motion to 
withdraw a plea filed one day after expiration of the statutory deadline, and holding "if a 
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defendant is advised of the deadline when the plea is entered, the trial court lacks 
jurisdiction to consider a[n untimely] motion to withdraw"); Utah R. Crim. P. 11(f). 
2. If this Court finds defendant was not properly informed about the filing 
deadline, relief should be denied because defendant invited any error 
Defendant argues that the trial judge should have expressly identified and 
corrected the deadline in the affidavit before the amended statute may be applied to him. 
Br. of Aplt. at 11-12. He claims that unless the trial judge established that he understood 
which deadline applied, he was not properly informed of the deadline and is entitled to a 
hearing on his motion. Id. at 8, 15. However, defendant is not entitled to the relief he 
seeks. 
Even assuming the trial court committed error in failing to clarify the erroneous 
statement in the plea affidavit, the error would not warrant reversal because defendant 
and his counsel invited it by assuring the court that they knew the contents of the 
affidavit, the contents were true and accurate, and they had no questions or concerns 
about them. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) (explaining the invited 
error doctrine). In other words, the court made the requisite inquiry concerning the 
written affidavit and defendant's understanding of the court's statements, informed 
defendant of the appropriate deadline for filing a motion to withdraw his pleas, and was 
led by defendant and his counsel to believe nothing more was required. 
Defense counsel represented to the court that he had "gone over the elements of 
the offenses," "the factual basis for the plea[s]" and "all of [defendant's] constitutional 
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rights" with defendant (R. 127:1-2). Defendant affirmed that he had talked with his 
counsel about his constitutional rights, that he knew he was giving up those rights by 
pleading guilty, and that he had read the affidavit, gone through it, and asked counsel all 
the questions he had (R. 127:3-5). Further, defense counsel signed the plea affidavit in 
open court, certifying the following: 
I certify that I am the attorney for Raymond M. Quintana, the 
defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I 
have read it to him/her: / have discussed it with him/her and believe that 
he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and 
physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an 
appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual 
synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these 
along with the other representations and declarations made by the 
defendant in the foregoing affidavit are accurate and true. 
(R. 52-58) (emphasis added) (the affidavit is attached as Addendum G). 
Moreover, aside from misleading the trial court and doing nothing to correct the 
affidavit's deadline—which he now admits is wrong—defense counsel requested that 
sentencing occur only four days later, thereby minimizing defendant's ability to file a 
timely motion to withdraw his pleas (R. 127:5-6). Having invited the trial court to believe 
that no inconsistency existed between the colloquy and the written affidavit, then cut 
defendant's time to file a timely withdrawal motion down to four days, defendant is in no 
position on appeal to challenge the court's failure to inquire further. Consequently, even 
assuming error in the trial court's failure to expressly recognize the erroneous statement 
in the affidavit and to correct it on the record, reversal is not warranted as the error was 
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invited by defendant and his counsel. See State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah 
App. 1991) (noting that fc*[t]he doctrine of invited error prohibits a party from setting up 
an error at trial and then complaining of it on appeal.") (internal quotation omitted); but 
see State v. Cornell, 2003 UT App 261, «[18, 74 P.3d 1171 (finding no invited error 
where the plea affidavit omitted the same two rule 11 rights that the trial court omitted 
from the colloquy, and neither defendant nor his counsel mentioned the omissions when 
the trial judge specifically asked if there was anything more they wanted the judge to 
address regarding the rule 11 rights), cert, granted, 80 P.3d 152 (Dec. 2, 2003). 
3, Even assuming defendant was not sufficiently informed of the 
proper deadline, relief is not automatically warranted as no extension 
of the filing time is mandated 
Finally, even if this Court determines that defendant was not properly informed of 
the appropriate deadline, it should still affirm the trial court's rejection of the withdrawal 
motion as untimely. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f) provides: 
Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty . . . is not a ground for setting the plea aside, but 
may be the ground for extending the time to make a motion under Section 
77-13-6. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(f) (emphasis added). Add. C. The permissive language of the rule 
makes it clear that extension of the filing time is not automatic. The rule leaves it to the 
trial court to determine whether the extension is warranted. Defendant is not entitled to 
an extension in this case because he was told in open court the proper deadline for filing 
his motion, he advanced no basis in the trial court to allow the judge to determine whether 
14 
or not to grant an extension, and any mistake about the deadline is attributable to 
defendant or his attorney. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
trial court's denial of defendant's untimely motion to withdraw his pleas. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED th i s^_ fday of January, 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
IS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
15 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellee were hand-delivered/mailed first class, postage pre-paid, to Kent R. Hart, 
attorney for defendant/appellant, Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, attorney for 
defendant/appellant 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 
czy^y clay of January, 2004. 
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Addendum A 
UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 
2002 Supplement 
REPLACEMENT VOLUME 8B 
1999 EDITION 
76-6-202. Burglary. 
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit: 
(a) a felony; 
(b) theft; 
(c) an assault on any person; 
(d) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1); 
(e) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3); or 
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a 
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
(3) A violation of this section is a separate offense from any of the offenses 
listed in Subsections (l)(a) through (f), and which may be committed by the 
actor while he is in the building. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
PER CURIAM 
*1 Appellant Vear Brooks appeals the denial of a 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea and multiple 
motions to correct an illegal sentence 
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea must be filed 
within thirty days after entry of the plea See Utah 
Code Ann § 77-13-6 (1999) Brooks's guilty plea 
was entered when he was sentenced on December 9, 
1994 See State v Ostler, 2001 UT 68, 1f 11, 31 P 
3d 528 (holdmg guilty plea entered when defendant 
is sentenced) Failure to file a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea within thirty days of its entry 
'extinguishes a defendant's right to challenge the 
validity of the guilty plea on appeal" State v Reyes, 
2002 UT 13, f 3, 40 P3d 630 The motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea in this case was filed over six 
years after its entry We lack jurisdiction to 
consider an appeal from the denial of an untimely 
Copr © West 2004 No Claim 
Pagel 
motion to withdraw the guilty plea See id 
In his motions to correct an illegal sentence, filed 
pursuant to rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, Brooks claims that the district court 
lacked jurisdiction to sentence him because the 
court did not comply with rule 11 of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure in acceptmg his guilty plea 
The motions sought to collaterally challenge the 
guilty plea and resulting conviction 'A request to 
correct an illegal sentence under rule 22(e) 
presupposes a valid conviction" State v Brooks 
908 P2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995) Accordingly, "rule 
22(e) does not allow a court to review a claim of an 
illegal sentence when the substance of the claim is a 
challenge to the underlying conviction" Id at 
860-61, see also State v Telford, 2002 UT 51, f 7, 
48 P 3d 228 ("[A] defendant may not employ rule 
22(e) to attack the underlying conviction") The 
assertion that rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure creates a jurisdictional 
requirement for imposition of sentence is not 
persuasive To the contrary, failure to make a timely 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea extinguishes the 
right to challenge the validity of the guilty plea See 
State v Abeyta, 852 P 2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993) 
To the extent that Brooks challenges his sentence, 
the record does not support his factual assertions 
He was not sentenced to a minimum mandatory 
term in this case The court sentenced him to an 
indeterminate term of zero to five years on each of 
two counts of attempted sexual abuse of a child, a 
third degree felony The court ordered the terms to 
run concurrently to each other and consecutively to 
a sentence Brooks was then serving as a result of a 
probation violation in a separate case The sentence 
in this case was within the allowable range for the 
third degree felony convictions The claim that 
Brooks was denied an opportunity to review the 
presentence report is raised for the first time on 
appeal, and we do not consider it other than to note 
that the record also reflects that counsel who 
represented Brooks at sentencing had reviewed the 
presentence report 
*2 Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the 
motions to withdraw the guilty plea and to correct 
an illegal sentence 
2003 WL 21282559 (Utah App), 2003 UT App 84 
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Before GREENWOOD, BENCH, and ORME, JJ. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for Official 
Publication) 
PER CURIAM. 
*1 Loran Elmo Swensen appeals from the denial of 
a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. This case is 
before the court on a sua sponte motion for 
summary affirmance. 
The State contends this court lacks jurisdiction 
over the appeal because the motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea was not timely filed in the district court. 
However, Swensen filed a timely notice of appeal 
following entry of the decision of the district court 
denying the motion, and this court has appellate 
jurisdiction to review that decision. 
Swensen entered a guilty plea in January 1994 to 
two counts of sexual abuse of a child, a second 
degree felony. At the change of plea hearing, the 
district court advised Swensen that any motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea must be filed within thirty 
days of entry of the guilty plea. Swensen did not file 
a timely motion to withdraw, but filed a direct 
appeal challenging his sentence. This court affirmed 
the sentence in an unpublished memorandum 
decision. See State v. Swensen, No. 940277-CA, 
Copr. ©West 2004 No ( 
Page 1 
slip op. (Utah Ct.App. May 11, 1995). 
In 1999, Swensen filed a motion to withdraw his 
1994 guilty plea, contending it was not taken in 
compliance with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure and was involuntary. The 
district court denied the motion both for lack of 
merit and based upon its conclusion that M[t]he 
defendant has shown no good cause to allow the 
court to consider withdrawing his guilty pleas of 31 
January 1994 more than thirty days after they were 
entered." 
We may affirm the trial court's judgment on any 
proper ground, even though not relied upon below. 
See Gardner v.Madsen, 949 P.2d 785, 789 n. 2 
(Utah Ct.App. 1997). A motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea must be "made within 30 days after the entry of 
the plea." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b)(1999). 
In State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 583 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1992), this court held that "[i]f a defendant 
is informed of the statute's thirty-day deadline for 
filing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, section 
77-13-6(2)(b) is jurisdictional." Accordingly, "[i]f 
the timeliness issue [is] properly addressed in the 
trial court, that court [is] without jurisdiction to hear 
defendant's motion and without a basis for 
extending the time for defendant to file his motion." 
Id 
Because Swensen was advised of the thirty-day 
deadline for making a motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea, the district court lacked jurisdiction to 
consider the merits of the untimely motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea or to extend the time for 
bringing a motion to withdraw. On that basis, we 
affirm the district court's denial of the motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
1999 WL 33244784 (Utah App.), 1999 UT App 340 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Addendum C 
UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 
1953 
VOLUME 8B 
2003 REPLACEMENT 
Titles 76 and 77 
(1)A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of 
the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea 
held in abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced. 
Sentence may not be announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea 
held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea shall be made within 30 
days of pleading guilty or no contest. 
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period 
specified in Subsection (2)(c) shall be pursued under Title 78, Chapter 35a, 
Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 
77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea. 
History: C. 1953, 77-13-6, enac ted by L. 
1980, ch . 15, § 2; 1989, ch. 65, § 1; 1994, ch . 
16, § 1; 2003, ch. 290, § 1. 
Amendment Notes . — The 2003 amend-
ment, effective May 5, 2003, rewrote Subsec-
tions (2Xa) and (2)(b) which, respectively, read 
"A plea of guilty or no contest may be with-
drawn only upon good cause shown and with 
leave of the court" and "A request to wi thdraw a 
plea of guilty or no contest is made by motion 
and shall be made within 30 days after the 
entry of the plea", added Subsection (2)(c), and 
deleted former Subsection (3) which read "This 
section does not restrict the r ights of an impris-
oned person under Rule 65B, U t a h Rules of 
Civil Procedure " 
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court i ne 
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a 
reasonable time to confer with counsel 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason 
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill A defendant may plead in the alternative 
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity If a defendant refuses to plead or 
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not 
guilty 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for tnal A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an 
early tnal In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury tnal 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has know-
ingly waived the nght to counsel and does not desire counsel, 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntanly made, 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the nght to the presumption of innocence, the 
nght against compulsory self-incnmination, the right to a speedy public tnal 
before an impartial jury, the nght to confront and cross-examine in open court 
the prosecution witnesses, the nght to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these nghts are waived, 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense 
to which the plea is entered, that upon tnal the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that 
the plea is an admission of all those elements, 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged cnme was actually committed by the defendant 
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial nsk of conviction, 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that 
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences, 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a pnor plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached, 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion 
to withdraw the plea, and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the nght of appeal is limited 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record 
or, if used, a wntten statement reciting these factors after the court has 
established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the 
contents of the statement If the defendant cannot understand the English 
language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to 
the defendant 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to 
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to 
make a motion under Section 77-13-6 
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included 
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by 
the court 
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court 
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence 
is not binding on the court 
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions pnor to any plea 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney 
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement 
and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea The judge 
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the 
proposed disposition will be approved 
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in 
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and 
then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea 
(1) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a 
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no 
contest, reserving in the record the nght, on appeal from the judgment, to a 
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-tnal motion A 
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to 
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a heanng within a 
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann § 77-16a-103 
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4 THE COURT: Sorry to keep you waiting so long. 
5 MR. BIGGS: It's alright, we needed the time. Your 
6 Honor, we've come to a disposition on this case and if we can 
7 bring Mr. Quintana out I'll explain it to you. 
8 This is Ray Quintana. 
9 THE COURT: Sure. We'll do appearances. State v. 
10 Raymond Michael Quintana. 
11 MS. CAMERON: Anne Cameron for the State. 
12 MR. BIGGS: Your Honor, David Biggs, Legal Defender's 
13 office for Mr. Quintana. Mr. Quintana is present. 
14 THE COURT: Okay, go ahead. 
15 MR. BIGGS: Your Honor, in these particular two 
16 matters what we've greed to do, Mr. Quintana has agreed to do 
17 is plead to two second degree burglaries, one burglary out of 
18 each file. Those burglaries being those burglaries which his 
19 fingerprints were found. They are second degree felonies, the 
20 maximum punishment as Mr. Quintana is aware is 1 to 15 in the 
21 State Prison and a $10,000 fine plus an 85 percent sir charge. 
22 I've gone over the elements of the offenses, Your Honor. I've 
23 gone over the factual basis for the plea. Mr. Quintana and I 
24 have also gone over all of his constitutional rights manifest 
25 in the document which I'm referring to and incorporating by 
1 reference and he is prepared to sign that in open court this 
2 morning. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. Tell me, is it Count 1 in case 
4 ending 1211 because there's the -
5 MR. BIGGS: They're all the same burglary language 
6 but Ms. Cameron would like the victims to be particular victims 
7 and she has the names. 
8 THE COURT: So in Count 1 it's Judith Cluff and in 
9 Count 5 it's Jeff Fugate, I guess? 
10 MS. CAMERON: No. 
11 THE COURT: And then in Count 3 it's Leonard Reynold? 
12 MS. CAMERON: That is correct for 1211, ending 1211. 
13 He is pleading guilty to - if you need a specific count for him 
14 to plead guilty to? 
15 THE COURT: I do. 
16 MS. CAMERON: It would be Count 1 Judith Cluff. 
17 THE COURT: Okay, Count 1. That's what I wanted to 
18 know. 
19 MS. CAMERON: I'd also like the other victims 
20 (inaudible). 
21 THE COURT: That's fine. That's fine. And then in 
22 case 1684, there's only the one second degree there and that's 
23 Jim Stefan and Esther Stefan, right? 
24 MS. CAMERON: That's correct, Your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. So do you understand that, Mr. 
1 Quintana? 
2 THE DEFENDANT: Yes I do, Your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: You would be in case ending 1684 
4 admitting that you committed a second degree burglary at 780 
5 East Loveland Avenue on or about September 23, 2002 and that 
6 you entered or remained unlawfully in the dwelling of Jim 
7 Stephan and Esther Stefan with the intent to commit a theft. 
8 You understand that? 
9 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. And in case ending 1211, you would 
11 be admitting that you at 5670 South Highland Drive, on or about 
12 September 13 of 2002 entered or remained unlawfully in the 
13 dwelling of Judith Cluff with the intent to commit a theft also 
14 a second degree felony burglary and as Mr. Biggs said 1 to 15 
15 on each. They can be added on top of each other rather than 
16 run at the same time and you give up all those constitutional 
17 rights you have to make the State bring in the witnesses, put 
18 them on the stand, be able to have Mr. Biggs ask them 
19 questions, have a jury for that matter decide your guilt or 
20 innocense and to be able to appeal from any errors of law that 
21 might be made. All those constitutional rights that you en]oy, 
22 you understand? 
23 THE DEFENDANT: I do. 
24 THE COURT: And you've talked with Mr. Biggs about 
25 and you appreciate that you're giving those up? 
3 
1 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. And that you are convicting 
3 yourself, in other words, the same as if we went through the 
4 trial and you were found guilty of those offenses I've ]ust 
5 talked to you about. 
6 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I realize that. 
7 THE COURT: You understand all of that, okay. 
8 THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
9 THE COURT: So you know what the penalties are. You 
10 know what your rights are. You know what the charges are. 
11 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. 
12 THE COURT: And other than what the attorneys have 
13 told me, they haven't forced you into this or promised you 
14 anything? 
15 THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am. 
16 THE COURT: You're not under the influence of any 
17 medication, drugs, anything that would effect your judgment? 
18 THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am. 
19 THE COURT: So you know what you're doing, you know 
20 what the charges are, you know what the penalties are. 
21 THE DEFENDANT: I do. 
22 THE COURT: And you understand the rights you give 
23 up. You've been through how much school? 
24 THE DEFENDANT: High school. 
25 THE COURT: Okay, enough that you can read and write? 
1 THE DEFENDANT: Right. 
2 THE COURT: And you read through that form, went over 
3 it, had a chance to ask Mr. Biggs any questions you had? 
4 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I have. 
5 THE COURT: So, to Count 1, case ending 1211, 
6 burglary, second degree felony at 5670 South Highland Drive, 
7 September 13, 2003 how do you plead? 
8 THE DEFENDANT: Guilty, Your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. In case ending 1684, burglary, 
10 second degree felony at 780 East Loveland Avenue, September 23, 
11 2002, how do you plead? 
12 THE DEFENDANT: Guilty, Your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. We'll accept your guilty pleas to 
14 both those counts and grant the State's motion to dismiss the 
15 remaining counts? 
16 MS. CAMERON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: And you can sign that if you haven't done 
18 that already. We'll have you execute that now and that will be 
19 further evidence that you understand your rights and the 
20 charges and the consequences or penalties to you. You have up 
21 until the time of sentencing to move to withdraw the plea for 
22 good cause. 
23 And I'm assuming we need pre-sentence report if for 
24 nothing more than restitution amounts. 
25 MR. BIGGS: Let me tell you what we're asking the 
5 
1 Court to do. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. 
3 MR. BIGGS: Your Honor, in this particular matter, 
4 Mr. Qumtana went to ]ury trial in another burglary under Jbdge 
5 Reese, approximately a month ago and his sentencing is set for 
6 Monday in front of Judge Reese. Pre-sentence report has 
7 already been prepared. I am asking you to send these two cases 
8 to Judge Reese for sentencing. Mr. Qumtana agrees and will 
9 stipulate to the restitution on these matters and I don't thLrk 
10 that there's anything necessary needful to get on these 
11 particular matters and Mr. Qumtana would like to get going. 
12 So what we're asking the Court to do is send these two to Judge 
13 Reese for sentencing although the other is set for Monday next. 
14 MS. CAMERON: I have no objection, Your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: All right. You've got to check with 
16 Judge Reese. If he'll take it and do it, I'll send it to him. 
17 Otherwise - do you want me to give you backup date just in 
18 case? And I would do an addendum to the pre-sentence report if 
19 I need to do it, if he doesn't feel like he wants to take it. 
20 There's nothing that requires him to do that but he well may 
21 and if he's willing to do it, he certainly can. 
22 MR. BIGGS: Certainly, Your Honor. Why don't you give 
23 us a two week date then. 
24 THE COURT: What I expect is that he'll take it and 
25 we'll just strike it so just pick a day. Just so I don't lose 
6 
1 it we'll do it June 2nd at nine. And I'll have my clerk 
2 deliver this to his clerk if he'll just let us know he's 
3 accepted it. 
4 MR. BIGGS: He's downstairs. 
5 THE COURT: He's down on three. He's on this same 
6 wing. 
7 MR. BIGGS: I'm going to go down there right now. 
8 THE COURT: All right. And these are all your 
9 witnesses? 
10 MS. CAMERON: These are the witnesses. 
11 THE COURT: I apologize to all of your for keeping you 
12 waiting. As I understand it, it resolved the matter so that we 
13 didn't do the trial anyway and hopefully it did it in a way 
14 that you're all satisfied and we certainly appreciate your 
15 participation and your patience and I guess Ms. Cameron will 
16 speak to you further. You're all excused and we'll let you go. 
17 And Mr. Quintana, I expect Judge Reese will do this 
18 so good luck to you. 
19 THE DEFENDANT: Alright, thank you. 
20 THE COURT: We'll excuse counsel on that. 
21 (Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
22 
23 
24 
25 -c-
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1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - MAY 12, 2003 
2 JUDGE ROBIN W. REESE PRESIDING 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 MR. BIGGS: Good morning, Your Honor, 26, 27 and 28. 
5 Raymond Quintana who is in custody. 
6 THE COURT: Set for sentencing on one case and a 
7 deposition I believe on two others; is that right? 
8 MR. BIGGS: Yes, sentencing on all three. We've 
9 already taken a plea on the other two. 
10 THE COURT: Oh, have you on the other two? 
11 MR. BIGGS: He's facing sentencing on three second 
12 degree felony and a Class B misdemeanor. 
13 THE COURT: We'll start with the felonies. 
14 MR. BIGGS: Alright. 
15 THE COURT: State of Utah v. Raymond Michael Quintana, 
16 and that is your name, sir? 
17 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
18 THE COURT: All right. The pre-sentence report that 
19 I have addresses, of course, only the case that was in my 
20 court. I don't have any information on the other but from what 
21 I've understood, they're very similar, both burglaries, both 
22 residential burglaries, second degree felonies and so you'd 
23 like to be sentenced today on all three; is that correct? 
24 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
25 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Biggs go ahead. 
1 MR. BIGGS: Your Honor, we received the pre-sentence 
2 report and I've gone over the pre-sentence report with my 
3 client. A couple of things that I wanted to bring to the 
4 Court's attention. On page 2, Your Honor, of 12, in the first 
5 paragraph it talks about what I was going to talk about so I 
6 will point out to you that Mr. Quintana has had a considerable 
7 and lengthy drug problem, heroin, and he has, because of the 
8 fact that he dropped out of high school, has very little in the 
9 way of life skills. However, if you go further in the report, 
10 Your Honor, you'll see that on page 9 of 12, in the last two 
11 paragraphs he has a very good family support. His mother was 
12 contacted and talked about how he behaves with his parent and 
13 with his siblings and they also contacted Mark North who was 
14 Mr. Quintana's last employer and talked about what a good 
15 worker he was. 
16 Now the recommendation is for state prison and the 
17 recommendation for state prison is based upon his prior 
18 criminal history as noted in the pre-sentence report and, you 
19 know, I feel like the last attorney that was up here, Manny was 
20 talking about the fact that you've got an individual who has a 
21 lengthy criminal history and Mr. Quintana does but in every 
22 individual's life there is that point where they want to make 
23 some substantial changes. 
24 I don't know if the Court recalls the jury trial that 
25 Mr. Quintana had in your Court but he was very respectful and 
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1 he was very involved in the case. It didn't take very long. 
2 It only took a day but throughout his entire criminal history, 
3 that was the first jury trial he's ever had and he mentioned to 
4 me afterwards how much he appreciated this Court, the 
5 prosecutor and all the witnesses allowing him to participate in 
6 that event, so much so that when we were set for jury trial in 
7 about three weeks after your jury trial in front of Judge 
8 McCleve, he just came to me and said, "Look I'll plead guilty, 
9 I did them. I'm not trying to make anybody's day any longer 
10 than it has to be." But the one thing that is clear from this 
11 pre-sentence report is that he has had some serious and 
12 significant problems with heroin. 
13 Now, what to do about that? Obviously, you as a 
14 Judge, you have to weigh helping him with that problem with the 
15 seriousness of the offenses and protecting society. He 
16 understands that but what we're hoping the Court will see in 
17 Mr. Quintana by my representations is that he's getting up 
18 there. He's closing in on 50 and he doesn't want to die a 
19 heroin addict and he doesn't want to die in prison and so he 
20 really wants to make a change. So what am I suggesting? I'm 
21 not suggesting probation because you're not going to give it 
22 and he knows you're not going to give it. It's kind of a novel 
23 suggestion and that would be the possibility of a 60 day 
24 evaluation to determine whether or not he is serious about 
25 trying to deal with his drug habit. 
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1 If that's too novel a suggestion, then I would ask 
2 the Court to run the three second degree felonies concurrently 
3 and along with the Class B misdemeanor. The board obviously 
4 will set the time he has to spend in prison and because of his 
5 prior prison commitments, he knows pretty much exactly what 
6 he's facing as far as time is concerned but he wanted to tell 
7 you - and I'll give him a minute to talk to you because he 
8 wants to talk to you about his experience in your courtroom 
9 that he really does want to make a change in his life. He 
10 thinks he is ready to make that change and I'm hoping that the 
11 prison or this Court will give him the opportunity to do that. 
12 THE COURT: All right. 
13 Ms. Cameron did you have any recommendations? 
14 MS. CAMERON: I do, Your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: You represent the State on all three of 
16 these cases? 
.17 MS. CAMERON: I do. Just a little bit of background 
18 on Mr. Quintana's cases. We did have one jury trial that was 
19 in this courtroom, he did have the finding of guilty. The 
20 other case, well, there were two cases that were actually set 
21 for trial last week. Mr. Quintana waived his ]ury. He didn't 
22 waive the trial. He didn't determine to plead guilty on those 
23 cases until the morning of trial which was last Thursday. We 
24 were set for two bench trials in a row. Your Honor, did hear 
25 the preliminary hearing on one of those cases. It was 
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1 originally charged with 22 counts, 11 burglaries. 
2 In examining the evidence and in the interest of 
3 judicial economy I determined that I only wanted to charge 
4 three of those burglaries and the three thefts that went with 
5 them. I did not include the burglary where a cat was killed 
6 and tortured. How I connect Mr. Qumtana to that is by people 
7 at the ADC telling me that they had heard that he had tortured 
8 that cat. There were dogs that were terrorized. Also another 
9 portion of it when I went down to have his fingerprints re-
10 inked for the comparison, he indicated to the fingerprint 
11 technician that he does file off the palm of his hand, 
12 including the fingerprints because of some weightliftmg 
13 callouses that would not include filing off his fingerprints. 
14 It took Karen seven attempts to get one fingerprint rolled. 
15 Given that plus some of the comments included in the 
16 pre-sentence report on page 2 where the pre-sentence report 
17 investigator indicates that he appears to lack even those basic 
18 abilities needed to function on a daily basis outside of prison 
19 and that you cannot overlook the danger he presents to the 
20 community and to himself with his heroin addiction. The fact 
21 that when he was in the juvenile detention center he actually 
22 escaped with the use of a firearm at one point when he was a 
23 juvenile and then his very, very lengthy history of adult crime 
24 at the, I think it is page 6 of the report indicates that he 
25 has been incarcerated since March 1997 and July 2000. He was 
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1 on parole eight times and each time unsuccessfully failed to 
2 comply and in the four years and seven months that he was 
3 outside of prison, just from reading the pre-sentence report, 
4 it seems that he was picked up on, I think 19 felonies. He is 
5 a danger to the community. 
6 I did, in our agreement on the two cases that we 
7 settled last Thursday, agree to recommend that those two, 1 to 
8 15 year sentences run concurrent with each other. It is my 
9 further recommendation to this Court that those two sentences 
10 run consecutive to the sentence for the trial that he had in 
11 here. He is a danger to the community. He has not indicated 
12 in any way that he wishes to change what he does. He files off 
13 his fingerprints so we can't find - they are not left at the 
14 scene, animals are tortured when he is there and he continues 
15 to burglarize and victimize people in the community. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. 
17 And now Mr. Biggs, if you have something else to say 
18 and if not Mr. Quintana I'll give you the last word. 
19 MR. BIGGS: Your Honor, just a couple of 
20 clarifications. Mr. Quintana vehemently denies ever torturing 
21 any animal. He was never convicted of that, and so I'll just 
22 spare him the opportunity of saying that and secondly, it's 
23 amazing how things get - they were trying to take his 
24 fingerprints and she said in jest, "Boy, this, you know, we're 
25 having difficulty doing this." And he goes, "Yeah, when I was 
r 
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1 in prison, I weight lifted and I used to get calluses on my 
2 palms of my hands and I would file off those palms." But he 
3 never, ever indicated that he was filing off his fingerprints 
4 for the purposes of not being detected. But at any rate, be 
5 that as it may, I think Mr. Quintana has something he'd like to 
6 say. 
7 THE COURT: Sure, go ahead. 
8 THE DEFENDANT: At this time I would like to express 
9 my deepest apologies to those I have hurt and victimized by my 
10 acts.. I am sorry and truly regret what I have done. I realize 
11 I offended them people as well as shamed and embarrassed myself 
12 and my family. I wish I could take it back what I've done, but 
13 I can't. All I can do is ask for your forgiveness and assure 
14 you that if there is any way possible that I can attempt to 
15 make up for what I've done, that I truly will. 
16 I would like the Court to try and understand my 
17 reasoning at the time for my acts in hopes that I can receive 
18 the help I do desperately need. I had come in debt with the 
19 bank. I was behind on my car payments. I lost my job, rent 
20 was due. My world was falling out from under me. I had so 
21 much stress and depression on myself that I relapsed back into 
22 using heroin to take away the pain and escape reality. This 
23 happened in a two month period. Not only was I in debt but I 
24 was addicted again and I couldn't go to a detox or a drug 
25 program because you needed money to do so. 
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1 Unless you've been addicted to heroin, you won't 
2 fully understand the sickness you go through. You'll sell your 
3 soul if you have to to get well. I've been using since th-2 age 
4 of 16. I don't know how to break the cycle. I've been 
5 incarcerated my whole life behind my drug addiction and I've 
6 never been given a chance to get the proper treatment I need. 
7 In prison the programs are limited. It's a warehouse for bed 
8 space only and is not a deterrent for me. This is where I ask 
9 the Court to realize this and please help. I need to break the 
10 cycle. I need to overcome my addiction and learn how to be 
11 stable and build a foundation for myself. I need a treatment 
12 program. I've heard a lot about the Odyssey House. It's a 
13 program that can help me. 
14 What I long to be is a productive part of society, 
15 somebody with a life of their own not a slave to drugs. My 
16 hope is you will hear my pleas and allow me one chance, ]ust 
17 one chance to make the change. I'm willing to do whatever is 
18 necessary to make up for what I've done and at the same time 
19 get the help I need. Allow me to do this, to go to prison and 
20 time may not be the answer. 
21 The Odyssey House is a good program, Your Honor, and 
22 you know, it's the last chance for me I feel at living a normal 
23 life. Once again, I sincerely apologize to the Court and to 
24 the victims and ask, again, to get help. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, one thing I should have 
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1 asked, is the complaining witness, has she been given notice? 
2 Is she here today, have any comments? 
3 MS. CAMERON: On that (inaudible)? 
4 THE COURT: Well, I guess on any of them. 
5 MS. CAMERON: I know the witnesses and victims from 
6 Thursday's case are aware that we were going to do this today 
7 and I'm quite sure our office made sure that the victim for 
8 your case. I didn't see her here. 
9 Are any of the victims present? 
10 THE COURT: It would appear not. 
11 I'm prepared to go forward, Mr. Quintana. Your 
12 attorney really hit it on the head with his first comments. My 
13 job is to try to balance the need to protect our community and 
14 at the same time, if we can rehabilitate you and if those can 
15 be done together then so much the better but as I look at your 
16 record here and I see the felonies you've been convicted of 
17 before this, including I think four other burglaries as an 
18 adult. When I look at the number of homes that you've admitted 
19 - or were convicted of burglarizing again, and I think of those 
20 victims, my concern is that probation would not insure the 
21 protection that I want to make sure we have here, and so I am 
22 going to put you in prison. 
23 On the case ending 2390, the burglary, a second 
24 degree felony, I'll impose the indeterminate term of 1 to 15 
25 years in the Utah State Prison. There was a theft conviction 
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1 as well but I'll impose no sentence on that. 
2 For the case ending 1684 burglary, a second degree 
3 felony, again, 1 to 15 years in prison and I am going to impose 
4 those sentences to run consecutively because of the fact that 
5 you have such a lengthy record and again in my judgment you're 
6 a significant threat to our community. 
7 And finally in the last case, 1211, burglary, a 
8 second degree felony, the sentence would be again 1 to 15 years 
9 in prison and I'll impose that sentence again to run 
10 consecutively with the sentences in the other two cases. I'm 
11 aware of the State's recommendation but again, it's my judgment 
12 that that's an appropriate sentence given your record and the 
13 number of homes that you've burglarized in our community. So 
14 Mr. Quintana, that's my sentence. 
15 MR. BIGGS: Your Honor, could he receive a 
16 recommendation for receiving credit for the 202 days he's 
17 alreadv served? 
^.Hereupon z* e -^a ..
 d _ o ^ :4. , z , ^ ^ , 
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CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing transcript in 
the before mentioned hearing held before Judge Robin W. 
Reese was transcribed by me from a video recording and is a 
full, true and correct transcription of the requested 
proceedings as set forth in the preceding pages to the best 
of my ability. 
Signed this 19th day of July, 2003 in Sandy, 
Utah. 
Carolyn Erickson 
Certified Shorthand Reporter 
Certified Court Transcriber 
My Commission expires May 4, 2006 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
ANNE A. CAMERON, 8865 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAY 2 7 2003 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
RAYMOND MICHAEL QUTNTANA, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case Nos. 021911684 
g 2 t 9 T j 2 r r > 
Hon. Sheila K. McCleve 
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas in the above referenced cases is denied. 
The defendant's motion is untimely as it was not made prior to his sentencing as required by 
Utah Code Annotated §77-13-6. Q 
DATED thisjfthday of May, 2003. 
BY THE; 
ORDER 
Case No. 021911684 
Page 2 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was delivered to 
David C. Biggs, Attorney for Defendant Raymond Michael Quintana, at 424 East 500 South, 
Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the >** day of May, 2003. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IfymtNk A). Ait//fTX*f4 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Case No. O&IMbMF* 
I, , hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been 
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights: 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes: 
A. 
B. 
C. 
Crime & Statutory 
Provision 
f4 '*0&9fti£Mf& 
D 6ft 
Degree Punishment 
Min/Max and/or 
.
 M M Minimum Mandatory A 
IT / , /^/^g +*£%! 
D. 
1 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me, I have read it, or 
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am 
pleading guilty (or no contest). 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are: 
gjjgg />v^ 
4 A*4<> 
^f &U% 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes 
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the 
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or 
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for 
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty 
(or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty 
(or no contest): 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights 
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead 
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights: 
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I 
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand 
2 
that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the 
appointed lawyer's service to me. 
I(ffiave ngt) (b*w^ waived m\ rights to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel, 
I have done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
If I have waived my right to counsel. I certify that I have read this statement and that 
I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty 
(or no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the 
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
is fij/lh ? &ff$ If I have not waived my rights to counsel, my attorney is 
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement. m\ rights, and the consequences of 
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
Jury Trial. I know that I ha\e a right to a speed) and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be gi\ ing up that right b\ pleading guilty (or no contest). 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have 
a jury trial, a ) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against 
me and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right !• , n attorney, would have the 
opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who teitifuJ against me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial. I could call 
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and 
testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the 
State would pay those cost. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I w ere to 
have a jury trial. I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I 
chose not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. 
I also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my 
refusal to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead 
guilty (or no contest). I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the 
charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me. I need only plead "not guilty." 
and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving 
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each element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the 
verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of 
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or 
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the 
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up 
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all 
the statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each 
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no 
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty. I will be subjecting myself to serving 
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or 
both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (859£) surcharge will be 
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my 
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of 
a plea agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run 
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each 
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or aw aiting sentencing 
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no 
contest). my^tmtyltyr no content^Teays^iow may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed on me. Ifthe offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was 
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be 
inappropriate. 
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Plea bargain. My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the result of a plea 
bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and 
provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those 
explained below:
 M . M * M . JAJ 
J-
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges 
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not 
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they 
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge. 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I 
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to 
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes 
because all of the statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I am VJ years of age. I have attended school through the /& grade. I can read 
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been 
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants 
which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under 
the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental 
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing 
or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
5 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) pleats), I must 
file a written notion to withdraw my plea(s) within 30 days after I have been sentenced 
and final judgment has been entered. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I 
show good cause. I will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after 30 days for any 
reason. 
Dated this _i£rday of "^)r 2£Q*. 
DEFENDANT v 
Certificate of Defense Attorney 
TfovHtrttP ft\* Attire, , the defendant 
\ statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have 
I certify that I am the attorney for. 
above, and that I know he/she has read the 
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its 
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, 
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of 
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are 
accurate and true. 
ATTORNEY FOTT^VDANT 
Bar N o . ^ f c V 
6 
Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I certify th&I anythe attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
tyfy/Effrv^ /top(U*&pa\ , defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant 
ancyfind that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the 
offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage 
a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the 
Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the 
Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the conviction 
of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance 
of the plea(s) would serve the public interest. 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Bar No. _ ^ & ^ 
7 Hrv 
Order 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses 
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, 
knowingly, and voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the 
crime(s) set forth in this Statement be accepted and entered. 
Dated this V day of 
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